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Abstract. We consider the classical machine scheduling, where n jobs need to
be scheduled on m machines, with the goal of minimizing the makespan, i.e., the
maximum load of any machine in the schedule. We study inefficiency of sched-
ules that are obtained when jobs arrive sequentially one by one, and choose them-
selves the machine on which they will be scheduled.
We measure the inefficiency of a schedule as the ratio of the makespan obtained
in the worst-case equilibrium schedule, and of the optimum makespan. This ratio
is known as the sequential price of anarchy (SPoA). We also introduce alterna-
tive inefficiency measures, which allow for a favorable choice of the order in
which the jobs make their decisions. We first disprove the conjecture of Hassin
and Yovel (OR Letters, 2015) claiming that for unrelated machines, i.e., for the
setting where every job can have a different processing time on every machine,
the sequential price of anarchy form = 2 machines is at most 3. We show that the
sequential price of anarchy grows at least linearly with the number n of players,
i.e., SPoA = Ω(n). Furthermore, we show that for a certain order of the jobs,
the resulting makespan is at most linearly larger than the optimum makespan. To
the end, we show that if an authority can change the order of the jobs adaptively
to the decisions made by the jobs so far (but cannot influence the decisions of
the jobs), then there exists an adaptive ordering in which the jobs end up in an
optimum schedule.
1 Introduction
We consider the classical optimization problem of scheduling jobs on unrelated ma-
chines. In this problem, each job has a (possibly different) processing time on each of
the m machines, and a feasible schedule is simply an assignment of jobs to machines.
For any such schedule, the load of a machine is the sum of all processing times of the
jobs assigned to that machine. In this optimization problem, the objective is to find a
schedule minimizing the makespan, that is, the maximum load among the machines.
In its game-theoretic version, jobs correspond to players who selfishly aim at min-
imizing their own cost, and choose which machine to place their own job accordingly.
This leads to some equilibrium in which no player has an incentive to deviate, though
the resulting schedule may not necessarily be optimal in terms of makespan. Such an
equilibrium might have a rather high social cost, that is, the makespan of the corre-
sponding schedule1 is not guaranteed to be the optimal one (see Example 1 below).
1 When each player chooses deterministically one machine, this definition is obvious. When
equilibria are mixed or randomized, each player chooses one machine according to some prob-
ability distribution, and the social cost is the expected makespan of the resulting schedule.
ar
X
iv
:1
61
1.
04
15
9v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  7
 M
ay
 20
17
2 Paul Giessler, Akaki Mamageishvili, Matu´sˇ Mihala´k, and Paolo Penna
The inefficiency of equilibria in games is a central concept in algorithmic game
theory, as it quantifies the efficiency loss resulting from a selfish behavior of the players.
The two most popular notions are probably the price of anarchy (PoA) [8] and the price
of stability (PoS) [2], which intuitively consider the most pessimistic and most optimistic
scenario:
– The price of anarchy compares the worst equilibrium with the optimal social cost;
– The price of stability compares the best equilibrium with the optimal social cost.
The price of anarchy corresponds to the situation (anarchy) in which there is no author-
ity, and players converge to some equilibrium by themselves. In the price of stability,
one can imagine that (somehow) one can suggest the players how to play, and if that is
an equilibrium then they will indeed follow the suggestion. This notion quantifies the
minimal efficiency loss if, for example, no equilibrium is actually a social optimum.
One issue with these notions is that, for some games, the bounds are either too
pessimistic or too optimistic, and that certain equilibria are perhaps difficult to justify:
How did the players find such “strange” equilibria?
Motivated by these issues, and observing that in some games “abnormal” equilibria re-
sult in unbounded price of anarchy, in [9] authors introduce the sequential price of an-
archy (SPoA). This is essentially the variant in which players, instead of choosing their
strategies simultaneously, play sequentially taking their decisions based on the previous
choices and also knowing the order of players that will make play. Formally, this corre-
sponds to an extensive-form game, and the corresponding equilibrium concept is called
a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Players always choose their strategy deterministically.
Example 1 (two jobs on two unrelated machines). Consider two jobs and two unrelated
machines, where the processing times are given by the following table [9]:
job 1 job 2
machine 1 1 `
machine 2 ` 1
The allocation represented by the gray box is a (pure Nash) equilibrium in the resulting
strategic game (if a job moves to the other machine, its own cost increases from ` to
`+ 1). The optimum makespan in 1 (swap the allocation), this example shows that the
PoA for two unrelated machines is unbounded.
1.1 Prior results (SPoA for unrelated machines)
The first bounds on the SPoA for unrelated machines have been obtained in [9]:
n ≤ SPoA ≤ m · 2n.
Therefore, SPoA is constant for constant number of machines and jobs, while PoA is
unbounded even for two jobs and two machines. The large gap in the previous bound
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naturally suggests the question of what happens for many jobs and many machines. This
was addressed by [3] which improved significantly the prior bounds:
2O(
√
n) ≤ SPoA ≤ 2n.
At this point one should note that these lower bounds use a non-constant number of
machines. In other words, it still might be possible that for constant number of machines
the SPoA is constant. For two machines, [7] proved a lower bound SPoA ≥ 3, and in
the the same work the authors made the following quite plausible conjecture:
Conjecture 1. For two unrelated machines, the SPoA = 3 for any number of jobs [7].
1.2 Our contributions
We disprove Conjecture 1 by showing that in fact the SPoA on two machines is not even
constant. Indeed, it must grow linearly and the conjecture fails already for few jobs:
– For five jobs we have SPoA ≥ 4 (Theorem 1);
– In general, it holds that SPoA ≥ Ω(n) (Theorem 2).
The result is also interesting because it says that the SPoA is non-constant already for
two machines (as the number of jobs grows). Moreover, it implies a strong separation
with the identical machines case where SPoA ≤ 2− 1m , for any numberm of machines
[7].
The idea that an “authority” can suggest the order in which players move so to
induce a good equilibrium, can be viewed as the price of stability (PoS) for these se-
quential games. We introduce this notion in two variants (a weaker and a stronger):
– Sequential Price of Stability (SPoS). The authority can choose the order of the
players moves. This order determines the tree structure of the corresponding game.
– Adaptive Sequential Price of Stability (adaptive SPoS). The authority decides the
players moves adaptively according to the choices made at each step.
The study of these two notions for two unrelated machines is also motivated by our
lower bound, and by the lack of any good upper bound on this problem. We prove the
following upper bounds for two unrelated machines (Theorems 3 and 4):
SPoS ≤ n
2
+ 1 adaptive SPoS = 1
The next natural question is to consider three or more machines. Here we show an
impossibility result, namely adaptive SPoS ≥ 3/2 already for three machines (Theo-
rem 5). That is, even with the strongest type of adaptive “authority”, it is not possible to
achieve the optimum. This shows a possible “disadvantage” of having players capable
of complex reasoning, like in extensive form games. In the classical strategic-games
setting, where we consider pure Nash equilibrium, the optimum is an equilibrium, that
is, PoS = 1 for any number of machines and jobs.
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Further related work. The sequential price of anarchy has been studied for other games
[6,1,5]. There is an enormous amount of literature on the classical algorithm-theoretic
research on machine scheduling, see, e.g., the textbook by Pinedo [10] and the survey
by Chen, Potts, and Woeginger [4] for the fundamental results and further references.
2 Preliminaries
In unrelated machine scheduling there are n jobs and m machines, and the processing
time of job j on machine i is denoted by pij . A solution (or schedule) consists of
an assignment of each job to one of the machines, that is, a vector s = (s1, . . . , sn)
where sj is the machine to which job j is assigned to. The load li(s) of a machine i in
schedule s is the sum of the processing times of all jobs allocated to it, that is, li(s) =∑
i:sj=i
pij . The social cost of a solution s is the makespan, that is, the maximum load
among all machines.
Each job j is a player who attempts to minimize her own cost costi(s), that is,
the load of the machine she chooses: costj(s) = lsj . Every player j decides sj , the
assignment of job j to a machine. The combination of all players strategies gives a
schedule s = (s1, . . . , sn).
In the extensive-form version of these games, players play sequentially, and they
decide their strategies based on the choices of the previous players and knowing that
the other players are (also) rational. The game is a complete information game. As
players enter the game sequentially, they can compute their optimal moves by the so-
called backwards induction: the last player makes her move greedily, the player before
the last makes the move also greedily (taking into account what the last player will do)
depending on the moves of the last, and so on. Any game of this type can be modeled
by a decision tree, which is a rooted tree where the non-leaf vertices are labeled with
players, and edges correspond to the strategies (see appendix for examples of decision
trees). Each leaf corresponds to a solution (schedule), which is simply the strategies
on the unique leaf-to-root path. Given the processing times P = (pij), the players can
compute the loads on the machines in each of the leaves. In case of ties, all players
know the deterministic tie-breaking rules of all the other players. A player can then
decide what the final outcome would be for each of her choices. Decisions obtained
this way constitute what is called the subgame-perfect equilibrium: for each subtree we
know what is the outcome achieved by the players in this subtree playing rationally,
given the previous choices up to this point. We usually represent the strategies (edges)
that are chosen by players in the subgame perfect equilibrium in bold, and the other
strategies as dashed edges.
Notation and formal definitions. We consider n jobs and m machines, denoted by J =
(J1, J2, . . . , Jn) and M = (M1,M2, . . . ,Mm) respectively. The processing times are
given by a matrix P = (pij), with pij being the processing time of job Jj on machine
Mi. The set of all such nonnegative n×mmatrices is denoted by Pnm and it represents
the possible instances of the game. For any P ∈ Pn,m as above, we denote by Tn,m the
set of all possible depth-n, completem-ary decision trees where each path from the root
to a leaf contains every job (player) exactly once. The whole game (and the resulting
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subgame perfect equilibrium) is fully specified by P , T , and the tie-breaking rule used
by the players. The most general – worst case – scenario is that ties are arbitrary (see
Definition 1). In the following we do not specify the dependency on the ties, and simply
denote by SPE(P, T ) the cost (makespan) of the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
game. One type of worst-case analysis is to assume the players’ order to be adversarial,
and the tree T being chosen accordingly. This is the same as saying that players arrive
in a fixed order (say J1, J2, . . . , Jn) and their costs P is chosen in adversarial fashion.
In this case we simply write SPE(P ) as the tree structure is fixed. For a fixed order
σ (a permutation) of the players, and costs P , we also write SPE(P, σ) to denote the
quantity SPE(P, T ) where T is the tree resulting from this order σ of the players (see
Figure 2a). The optimal social cost (makespan) is denoted by OPT (P ).
We next introduce formal definitions to quantify the inefficiency of subgame perfect
equilibria in various scenarios (from the most pessimistic to the most optimistic). The
sequential price of anarchy (SPoA) compares the worst subgame perfect equilibrium
with the optimal social cost,
SPoA = sup
P∈Pnm
SPE(P )
OPT (P )
.
In the sequential price of stability (SPoS), we can choose the order σ in which players
play depending on the instance P . The resulting subgame perfect equilibrium has cost
SPE(P, σ), which is then compared to the optimum,
SPoS = sup
P∈Pnm
min
σ∈Sn
SPE(P, σ)
OPT (P )
,
where σ ranges over all permutations Sn of the n players. Adaptive Sequential Price of
Stability (adaptive SPoS). In this case, we can choose the whole structure of the tree,
meaning that for each choice of a player, we can adaptively choose which player will
play next. The adaptive price of stability is then defined as
adaptive SPoS = sup
P∈Pnm
min
T∈Tnm
SPE(P, T )
OPT (P )
.
Note that by definition adaptive SPoS ≤ SPoS ≤ SPoA.
3 Linear lower bound for SPoA
In this section we consider the sequential price of anarchy for two unrelated machines.
In [7] the authors proved a lower bound SPoA ≥ 3 for this case, and they conjectured
that this was also a tight bound. We show that unfortunately this is not the case: Already
for five jobs, SPoA ≥ 4, and with more jobs the lower bound grows linearly, i.e.,
SPoA = Ω(n).
3.1 A lower bound for n = 5 players
Theorem 1. For two machines and at least five jobs, the SPoA is at least 4.
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Proof. Consider the following instance whose subgame perfect equilibrium is shown
as gray boxes:
J1 J2 J3 J4 J5
M1 3− 11ε ε ε 1− 2ε 2− 8ε
M2 ε 2− 9ε 2− 8ε 1− 2ε 1− 2ε
(1)
Note that the optimum has cost 1, while the subgame perfect equilibrium costs 4− 13ε.
By letting ε tend to 0 we get the desired result.
To see why this is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium, we assume without loss of
generality that players break ties in favor of machine M1. Then we note the following:
1. If the first three jobs follow the optimum, then J4 prefers to deviate to M2, which
causes J5 to switch to machine M1:
J1 J2 J3
M1 3− 11ε ε ε
M2 ε 2− 9ε 2− 8ε
⇒
J4 J5
1− 2ε 2− 8ε
1− 2ε 1− 2ε
Now the cost for J3 would be 2− 6ε.
2. Given the previous situation, J3 prefers to deviate to M2 because in this way J4
and J5 choose M1, and her cost will be 2− 7ε:
J1 J2
M1 3− 11ε ε
M2 ε 2− 9ε
⇒
J3 J4 J5
ε 1− 2ε 2− 8ε
2− 8ε 1− 2ε 1− 2ε
Now the cost for J2 would be 3− 9ε.
3. Given the previous situation, J2 prefers to deviate to M2 because in this way J3
and J4 choose M1, J5 chooses M2, and the cost for J2 is 3− 10ε:
J1
M1 3− 11ε
M2 ε
⇒
J2 J3 J4 J5
ε ε 1− 2ε 2− 8ε
2− 9ε 2− 8ε 1− 2ε 1− 2ε
Now the cost for J1 would be 3− 10ε.
We have thus shown that, if J1 chooses M2 then her cost will be 3− 10ε. To conclude
the proof, observe that if J1 chooses M1, then by similar arguments as above job J2
prefers to choose machine M2 and all players will choose the allocation in (1), the cost
for J1 in this case is also 3− 10ε. Since players break ties in favor of M1, we conclude
that the subgame perfect equilibrium is the one in (1). uunionsq
Remark 1 (tie-breaking rule). In the construction above, we have used the fact that
players break ties in favor of M1. These assumptions can be removed by using slightly
more involved coefficients for the ε terms, so that ties never occur.
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Remark 2 (faster linear program formulation). Our first lower bound for n = 5 players
has been obtained by solving a linear program, suggested in [7]. A crucial achievement
for the speedup of the program is the discovery of the property that we describe in
Appendix B. It allows to exclude a high number of combinations for the last layer of
the tree. As the last layer of the tree represents more than half of the internal nodes in
the tree, the number of combinations that has to be generated can be reduced drastically.
For example, for n = 5, the improvement is from 2 · 109 to 6 · 106.
3.2 Linear lower bound
Extending the construction for n = 5 players is non trivial as this seems to require
rather involved constants that multiply the ε terms. However, we notice that these terms
only help to induce more involved tie-breaking rules of the following form:
Definition 1 (arbitrary tie-breaking rule). We say that the tie-breaking rule is arbi-
trary if each player uses a tie-breaking rule between machines which possibly depends
on the strategies played by all the other players.
The following theorem gives our general lower bound:
Theorem 2. Even for two machines, the SPoA is at least linear in the number n of jobs,
in the case of arbitrary tie-breaking rule.
Proof. We consider the following instance with n = 3k − 1 jobs arriving in this order
J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J3k−5 J3k−4 J3k−3 J3k−2 J3k−1
M1 k + 1 0 0 k 0 0 · · · 3 0 0 1 2
M2 0 k k 0 k − 1 k − 1 0 2 2 1 1
and prove that the subgame perfect equilibrium is the gray allocation which results in
a makespan k + 2, while the optimal makespan is 1. This requires players to use the
following tie-breaking rules in the first part: if player J1 chooses machine M1, then J2
and J3 prefer to avoid player J1, that is, they choose the other machine in case of ties
in their final cost.
We prove this by induction on k. The base case is k = 2 and it follows directly from
the example in Equation (1) with ε = 0. As for the inductive step, the proof consists of
the following two steps (claims below).
Claim. If the first three jobs choose their zero-cost machines, then all subsequent jobs
implement the subgame perfect equilibrium on the same instance with k′ = k− 1. The
cost of J1 in this case is k′ + 2 = k + 1.
Proof (of Claim). Note that the sequence starting from J4 is the same sequence for
k′ = k − 1. Since the first three jobs did not put any cost on the machines, we can
apply the inductive hypothesis and assume that all subsequent players play the subgame
perfect equilibrium. The resulting cost on machine M2 will be k′ +2 = k+1, and this
is the machine chosen by J1.
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Claim. If the first job J1 chooses M2, then both J2 and J3 choose M1.
Proof (of Claim). Choosing M2 costs J2 and J3 at least k, no matter what the sub-
sequent players do. If they instead choose M1, by the previous claim, their cost is
k′ + 1 = k which they both prefer given their tie-breaking rule.
The above two claims show that if J1 chooses machineM2 then she is paying a cost
k + 1, while in the following we show that if she chooses machine M1, she will pay a
cost k + 1 in this scenario as well. The tie-breaking rule is that player J1 prefers the
cost k + 1 on the first machine M1.
In the second part of the proof we assume different tie-breaking rules for the last
two players J3k−2 and J3k−1, depending on which of the two players J2 and J3 choose
machine M2.
Now we consider the case where job J1 chooses machine M1, and show that she
pays exactly k + 1. If player J2 chooses machine M1, then we assume that player J3
breaks ties in favor of M2: choosing M2 results in a cost of k + 1 in the end, instead of
some cost on machine M1, which is at least k + 1. If job J3 gets assigned to machine
M2 then by backwards induction we can show that no player among J4, · · · , J3k−3 gets
assigned to machine where they have non-zero cost. This way only the last two players
are left and we can assume that player J3k−2 prefers to get assigned to machine M1
and pay k + 2 instead of getting assigned to machine M2 and pay k + 2 there, while
the last player J3k−1 prefers to get assigned to machine M2 and pay the cost k + 1
there. Therefore, job J2 gets cost k + 2, but here we can assume that she prefers cost
k + 2 that she gets on machine M2. Therefore, job J2 gets assigned to machine M2 in
the subgame perfect equilibrium state. Then again, by the same backwards induction
we conclude that all players J3, · · · , J3k−3 get assigned to the machine where they
have cost 0, and the last two jobs J3k−2 and J3k−1 choose machine M2, here again we
assume that player J3k−2 prefers to pay k+2 on machineM2 than to pay the same cost
on machine M1. This way the load on machine M1 is k+1, while the load on machine
M2 is k + 2, which finishes the proof of the theorem.
See appendix for the discussion of the above tie-breaking rule.
4 Linear upper bound on the SPoS
In this section we give a linear upper bound on the sequential price of stability for
two machines (Theorem 3 below). Unlike in the case of the sequential price of anarchy,
here we have the freedom to choose the order of the players (and suggest a particular tie-
breaking rule). Though finding the best order can be difficult, we found that a large set
of permutations already gives a linear upper bound on SPoS. In particular, it is enough
that the “authority” divides the players into two groups and puts players in the first
group first, followed by the players from the second group. Inside each group players
can form any order. The main result of this section is the following theorem:
Theorem 3. For two machines, the SPoS is at most n2 + 1.
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Proof. Consider an optimal assignment and denote the corresponding makespan by
OPT . By renaming jobs and machines, we can assume without loss of generality that
in this optimal assignment machine M1 gets the first k ≤ n2 jobs, and machine M2 gets
all the other jobs:
{J1, J2, . . . , Jk} →M1 , {Jk+1, . . . , Jn} →M2 .
Take the sequence given by the jobs allocated to M1 followed by the jobs allocated to
M2,
J1, J2, . . . , Jk, Jk+1, . . . , Jn.
We prove that for this sequence there is a subgame perfect equilibrium whose makespan
is at most (k + 1) ·OPT .
In the proof we consider the first player who deviates. We distinguish two cases,
corresponding to the next two claims.
Claim. If the first player Jd who deviates is in {Jk+1, . . . , Jn}, then she does not im-
prove.
Proof (of Claim). Observe that all players in {J1, J2, . . . , Jk}, which came before
player Jd, did not deviate. Machine M1 has thus exactly the jobs that it gets in the
optimum. If Jd stays on M2, her cost will be at most OPT (in the worst-case, all sub-
sequent jobs choose to stay on M2). Moving to M1 will in the end produce a schedule
with fewer jobs on M2 and more jobs on M1, compared to the optimum. The cost on
M1 is therefore at least OPT (otherwise the new schedule has smaller makespan than
OPT , a contradiction with the optimality), which is the cost of Jd when deviating.
The remaining case is the following one.
Claim. If the first player Jd who deviates is in {J1, . . . , Jk}, then any subgame perfect
equilibrium has the makespan at most (t+ 1) ·OPT where t = k + 1− d.
Proof (of Claim). The proof is by induction on t. For t = 1, the deviating player is the
last in {J1, . . . , Jk}, i.e., Jk. Recall that if Jk does not deviate, then by the previous
claim, Jk guarantees her cost to be at most OPT . Thus, if Jk deviates to M2, then in
the resulting equilibrium schedule she cannot pay more, i.e., she pays at mostOPT . We
now argue that if Jk deviates, M1 will have, in the resulting equilibrium, load at most
2 · OPT . Clearly, in the resulting equilibrium, load on M2 is at most OPT . Some of
the jobs among Jk+1, . . . , Jn may be assigned to M1 in this equilibrium. Moving them
all to machine M2 will result in load on M2 being at most 2 ·OPT (since all these jobs
are, in the optimum solution, on M2). Hence, each of the jobs among Jk+1, . . . , Jn that
decided to move to M1 in the resulting equilibrium cannot have a worse cost than that
of staying on M2, which guarantees cost at most 2 ·OPT .
If the first player who deviates from the optimal assignment is Jk−t, then we argue
similarly that the makespan is at most (t+ 1) ·OPT . By induction we can assume that
if player Jk−t stays on the first machine then she is guaranteed to pay at most t ·OPT ,
while if she deviates then we know she is paying at most t·OPT on the second machine.
In the latter case, if any player Jk+1, . . . , Jn deviates from the second machine to the
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M1
M2
M1
M2
one of these jobs was on M2
new initial load
︸︷︷︸︸︷︷︸
initial load
︸︷︷︸
initial load any job on M1
Fig. 1: An initial constrained optimum (left) and a new constrained optimum if one
player deviates improving her own cost (right).
first machine then she is paying at most (t+1)·OPT , because otherwise she would stay
on the second machine and pay at most (t+ 1) ·OPT . Therefore, by induction we get
that this sequence results into a solution which has a makespan at most (k+ 1) ·OPT ,
which completes the proof. uunionsq
The two claims above imply the theorem. uunionsq
Remark 3. This result cannot be extended to three or more machines, because the third
machine would change the logic of the proof. We can no longer assume that the players
on the second machine in the optimum assignment can guarantee low costs for them by
simply staying on that machine.
5 Achieving the optimum: the adaptive SPoS
In this section we study the adaptive sequential price of stability. Unlike the previous
models, here we assume that there is some authority, which has a full control over the
order of the players. It cannot only fix the complete order, but can also change the order
depending on the decision that previous players made. At the same time, the players still
have a complete freedom about choosing any strategy, and therefore, the best outcome
for them. Yet, the players also know the whole decision tree, and thus the strategy with
which the authority chooses the order. This model is the closest instantiation of a general
extensive form game compared to the previously studied models in this paper. This way
the authority has an option to punish players for deviating from the optimum path (path
leading to social optimim) by placing different players after the deviating decisions of
the deviating player. As a result, rational players may achieve much better solutions in
the end. The following theorem shows that achieving the optimum solution is possible
for 2 machines:
Theorem 4. For two machines, the adaptive SPoS is 1.
Proof (Main Idea). The main idea of the proof is as follows. Each internal node of a tree
corresponds to a choice of some player, and the path (edges) to that node correspond to
an allocation of a subset of players (the nodes on the node-to-root path). We consider
the corresponding constrained optimum, that is, an allocation of all remaining jobs that
minimizes the makespan, given the fixed allocation of the previous players. Among
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these remaining players, we then find a particular one for which the constrained op-
timum is better than any constrained optimum if she deviates. If this player deviates,
we can punish such deviation by letting the others implement the more expensive con-
strained optimum (by adaptively fixing their order).
Proof. For any node h of the tree, let Sh be the subset of players that appeared on the
previous nodes (i.e., from the parent of h up to the root), and let Ah be the resulting
allocation (described by the path). Let opth be the constrained optimum, that is, the
allocation of all remaining jobs Rh which, combined with Ah, minimizes the resulting
makespan. We now choose a suitable player J∗(h) to put on node h, according to the
following:
Claim. There exists a player J∗(h) among the remaining players Rh such that the
following holds. If J∗(h) deviates from the constrained optimum opth, then the new
constrained optimum (if implemented) is more costly for J∗(h).
Proof. Let OPTh be the makespan of opth. Without loss of generality, suppose that
OPTh is determined by machine M2. Consider any job J ′ ∈ Rh that opth allocates to
the other machineM1. Note that if no such job exists, then the constrained optimum can
be implemented by any order of the remaining jobs Rh, since they prefer machine M2,
because of the definition of constrained optimum. Suppose we allocate J ′ to machine
M2, and consider the new constrained optimum opth′ . If the load on M2 is now larger
than OPTh, then we choose J∗(h) = J ′ as the player to move at node h in the tree: if
this player deviates to machine M2, she gets a worse cost because the new constrained
optimum will be implemented (backwards induction shows that the new constrained op-
timum will be implemented). Otherwise, if in the new constrained optimum the load on
M2 is smaller than OPTh, then we choose J∗(h) as follows. Since OPTh′ ≥ OPTh,
the machine M1 is the bottleneck, that is, its load is OPTh′ . This means that there is
a job J ′′ which in this new constrained optimum is assigned to M1, but in the original
constrained optimum was on the other machine M2. Then we choose J∗(h) = J ′′ be-
cause this job satisfies the condition of the claim: if J ′′ deviates to M1, the resulting
constrained optimum will be as expensive as OPTh′ ≥ OPTh, while staying on M2
gives the cost OPTh to her. uunionsq
At each node h, the chosen player J∗(h) can either follow the constrained optimum,
or deviate. Backwards induction guarantees that in either case the remaining players
implement the resulting constrained optimum. The above claim implies that J∗(h) does
not deviate from the constrained optimum opth.
Surprisingly, the previous result cannot be extended to more than 2 machines:
Theorem 5. For three or more machines, the adaptive SPoS is at least 32 .
Proof. Consider the following instance with three machines and three jobs, where the
optimum is shown as gray boxes:
J1 J2 J3
M1 4− ε 2 2
M2 4 3 3
M3 6 6− ε 6− ε
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We distinguish two cases for the first player to move (the root of the tree), and show
that in neither case the player will implement the optimum:
1. The first to move is J1. This player will choose the cheapest machine M1, because
none will join this machine. Indeed, the second player to move will choose M2
knowing that the last one will then choose M3.
2. The first to move is J2 or J3. This player will chooseM2 and not M1. Indeed, if the
first player to move, say J2, chooses M1, then either (I) the other two follow also
the optimum (which costs 4 to J2) or (II) they choose another solution, whose cost
is at least 6−ε. In the later case we have the lower bound. In case (I), we argue that
choosing M2 is better for J2, because no other player will join: for the following
players, being both on machine M1 is already cheaper than being on M2 with J2.
In the first case, given that J1 is allocated to M1, the cheapest solution costs 6 − ε. In
the second case, one among J2 or J3 is allocated to M2. The best solution in this case
costs again 6− ε. This completes the proof. uunionsq
Remark 4. The analysis in the proof of Theorem 4 cannot be extended to more than 2
machines even if we assume that the machines are identical, see the appendix.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we disproved a conjecture from [7] and gave a linear lower bound con-
struction. On the other hand, for the best sequence of players we proved a linear upper
bound, moreover we proved an existence of a sequential extensive game which gives an
optimum solution. One possible direction for a future research is to prove or disprove
that sequential price of stability is 1 for identical machines. Up to this point, we were
unable to prove it or find a counterexample.
Acknowledgments. We thank Paul Du¨tting for valuable discussions.
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A Decision trees
J2
J3 J3
J1 J1J1J1
M1 M2
M1 M2
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
M2M1
social optimum sequential solution
(a) A decision tree with fixed sequence.
M1 M2
M1 M2
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
M2M1
social optimum
J3
J1 J2
J1 J1J2J2
sequential solution
(b) A decision tree with non fixed sequence.
Fig. 2: Decision trees with fixed and non fixed sequences and the corresponding sequen-
tial solutions. Dashed edges represent players’ decision which are not an equilibrium,
while the unique equilibrium (sequential solution) is given by the path of solid edges
from the root to a leaf.
B Enhanced linear programming
It is worth mentioning that in [7] the authors discussed a linear program for finding
lower bounds on the SPoA. In this approach the variables are the processing times
{pij , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, and the approach essentially goes as follows:
– Fix the subgame perfect equilibrium structure, that is, the sequence of players and
all the decisions in the internal nodes, this also gives the sequential equilibrium;
– Fix the leaf which is the optimum, and impose that the optimum makespan is at
most 1;
For every fixed subgame perfect equilibrium tree structure, we have one constraint for
each internal node (decision of a player). The optimum state (leaf) should also be fixed
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and both numbers have to be assumed to be at most 1 by adding two additional con-
straints to the linear program. By maximizing the maximum value of loads on the ma-
chines in the leaf which corresponds to the sequential equilibrium, we get the worst case
example for this particular tree structure. There are 2n−1 internal nodes in the decision
tree with n players. Therefore, this approach requires exploring 22
n−1 many possible
subgame perfect equilibria tree structures, and for each of them we have to decide where
is the optimum among 2n leaves and solve a linear program of size 2n ×O(n).
We managed to solve the case n = 5 players with the aid of a computer program
completely by learning the tree structure of the subgame perfect equilibrium closely
and breaking the symmetries. It is clear that the extremely fast growing number of
possible tree structures makes the program very time-consuming even for small values.
Consequently, we tried to exclude combinations from the computation, i.e. we avoid to
start the linear programming solver for certain tree structures. There are some trivial
cases that we present for the intuition. The first is that not all leaves of the tree should
be tested for the position of the optimum. Both left and rightmost leaf nodes can be
excluded from the possible optimum position due to the property that SPoA is 1 in
both cases. For the same reason, all tree structures where the equilibrium is located at
those extreme leaves can also be ignored. Additionally, the leaf where the equilibrium
is achieved should be avoided for the optimum position. The next idea is that trees that
are mirror images of other trees with regard to the vertical axis will lead to an equal
SPoA.
During the experimental investigations of possible outcomes based on the structure
of the game tree, we found out that a relatively big part of game tree structures always
leads to an infeasible linear program, regardless of the position of the optimum. Con-
sider the very simple tree structure depicted in Figure 3. Solid line represent the best
responses in each node. It is obvious that if the best response of player 2 in the left node
is to choose machine 1 then the best response in the right node cannot be to choose the
machine 2. We generalized this observation to arbitrary values of players n and ma-
chines m. The observation is limited to the nodes in the second lowest level of the tree,
the best responses of the last player Jn.
Additional notation. We denote the nodes of a T ∈ Tnm byH and the nodes in the level
i by Hi. Clearly in the case of adaptive sequences, Hi may contain different players,
while in the case of fixed sequences, in Hi all the nodes correspond to exactly one
player.
Let p(h) denote the parent node of node h in tree t. We define the child index
c(h) = i ∈ M of node h if h is the i-th child of it parent p(h), this mean that the edge
from p(h) to h represents that the agent corresponding to p(h) selects Mi. Every node
h on the j-th layer of t is defined by the choices of the agents playing before agent Jj .
These decisions create a unique path from the root of t to h. The nodes on the path from
the root r to h are P (h) = {r, ..., p(p(h)), p(h), h} = {h′ ∈ H|h ∈ th′} where th′ is
the subtree of t rooted at h′. These definitions allow us to define the set of agents that
selected a certain machine i before node h: B(i, h) = {j ∈ J | p(h′) ∈ Hj ∧ h′ ∈
P (h) ∧ c(h′) = i}. Then the observation is the following:
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Observation 1 For every pair of nodes in the second lowest layer h, h′ ∈ Hn if the
best response of player Jn in h is i, then it implies that the best response in h′ is also i
if ∀i′ ∈M \ i : B(i′, h) ⊆ B(i′, h′) holds.
1
2 2
M
M M
M M M1
1
12
2
2
Fig. 3: Conflicting configuration
Remark 5. We could not find any example that would give an (even locally) better lower
bound on sequential price of anarchy than it is in the proof of Theorem 2. For n ≤ 7,
our computer program searched the whole space and the results obtained above are the
best. We believe that the construction from the proof of the theorem gives the best lower
bound example.
C Tie breaking rule
It is worth noting that in [6] authors consider a different game (routing) and construct an
unbounded lower bound example for the sequential price of anarchy, but their analysis
heavily uses a carefully chosen tie-breaking rule. In contrast, for our case we solved
linear programs with strict inequalities obtained from the subgame perfect equilibria
tree structure given in the example from the proof of theorem 2, by introducing small ε
for strict inequalities. There are solutions for n = 8 and n = 11, that is linear programs
are feasible. Therefore, at least for small n’s we can drop the assumption about tie-
breaking rules completely, but the solution involves complicated coefficients for ε’s
and for the sake of exposition we do not present the exact solutions here.
D Example for identical machines
The following example shows that the analysis of Theorem 4 can not be extended to 3
machines even in the case of identical machines. Assume that we havem = 3machines,
the initial loads on these machines are (0, 2, 6) and there are 3 jobs left to be assigned
with processing times 7, 5 and 5. Note that the constrained optimum here is (10, 9, 6),
that is the first job with processing time 7 gets assigned to the second machineM2, while
both jobs with processing times 5 and 5 get assigned to machineM1. On the other hand,
if any of these players chooses different machine their cost is strictly decreasing in the
subgame perfect equilibrium solution. We did not find any example where the claim of
Theorem 4 is wrong for more than 2 identical machines, unlike the case of unrelated
machines.
